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a b s t r a c t 
We study how information on local (dis)amenities is transmitted and manifested in housing markets. Using na- 
tionwide data on multifamily homes in South Korea, we analyze heterogeneity in the eﬀect of a sex oﬀender’s 
presence on sale prices and rents of nearby homes. Our results demonstrate that the price eﬀect of the oﬀender’s 
move-in varies signiﬁcantly by spatial context. People react more strongly and persistently to the move-in of the 
oﬀender in places wherein indicators of social connectedness are stronger, such as places with relatively low 
population density. We also ﬁnd that, unlike housing prices, rents do not change in response to the move-in of a 
sex oﬀender. These heterogeneous housing market responses may be attributed to better acquisition of and higher 
sensitivity to information on local (dis)amenities among (potential) members in highly connected communities, 
particularly among homeowners. We interpret our ﬁndings as suggestive evidence that social capital and social 
networks are important sources of information on local (dis)amenities. 
Introduction 
Economic theory suggests that if the public is informed about local 
conditions or (dis)amenities, these (dis)amenities will be transmitted to 
housing prices. However, little is known about the underlying mecha- 
nisms through which information on local (dis)amenities is acquired, 
perceived, and evaluated. In this study, we attempt to examine some of 
the eﬀects of local (dis)amenities on housing market responses by ana- 
lyzing heterogeneity in these responses across spatial attributes of local 
areas and household housing tenure. 
We build on the literature that has demonstrated the capitalization 
of the presence of sex oﬀenders into sale prices. The most notable ex- 
ample is Linden and Rockoﬀ (2008) . This literature has mainly focused 
on the sales data of single-family homes in single counties in the U.S., 
in the context of Megan’s Law 1 ( Linden and Rockoﬀ, 2008; Pope, 2008; 
Wentland et al., 2014; Caudill et al., 2015 ). Using the nationwide trans- 
action database of multifamily homes in South Korea, we provide exter- 
nal validation to evidence from this literature and expand the analysis 
to heterogeneous housing market reactions. Speciﬁcally, we address the 
following two main research questions: 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: seonghoonkim@smu.edu.sg (S. Kim), rstleeko@nus.edu.sg 
(K.O. Lee). 
1 Since the 1994 Wetterling Crimes against Children and Sexually Violent Of- 
fender Registration Act and the 1996 Amendment to the Wetterling Act, com- 
monly known as ‘Megan’s Law’, U.S. state governments have been required to 
create a sex oﬀender registry and to disseminate information on the location 
and description of sex oﬀenders to the public. 
1 Do housing market responses to the move-in of sex oﬀenders evidenced 
in previous studies in the U.S. translate to South Korea? 
2 What are the underlying mechanisms that drive heterogeneity in housing 
market responses? 
First, we ﬁnd that the price eﬀect of the move-in of sex oﬀenders 
varies signiﬁcantly by spatial context. The magnitude and localization 
of the price reduction we ﬁnd are comparable to those from the previous 
studies related to the U.S., at approximately 5% within a 150-meter ra- 
dius of the nearest sex oﬀender. However, our ﬁnding that the average 
price eﬀect disappears after 1 month is contrary to the evidence found in 
the U.S.-based studies that the eﬀect persists for 1 or 2 years ( Linden and 
Rockoﬀ, 2008; Pope, 2008 ). In trying to understand this diﬀerence, we 
ﬁnd that while Megan’s Law mandates real estate agents to disclose the 
presence of nearby sex oﬀenders to potential homebuyers, such infor- 
mation disclosure is not required in South Korea. We also note that the 
population density and population turnover are signiﬁcantly lower for 
the U.S. samples when compared to our Korean sample. Looking at areas 
in South Korea that are similar to the U.S. in these characteristics, our 
results are much more comparable. For instance, we ﬁnd that multifam- 
ily homes located in areas with low population density and areas with 
low residential turnover experience a longer-term and larger reduction 
in sales prices after the oﬀender’s move-in. It is also evident that popula- 
tion density plays a dominant role in explaining spatial heterogeneity in 
population turnover. Our results suggest that people react more strongly 
and persistently to the move-in of a sex oﬀender in places wherein indi- 
cators of social connectedness are stronger, but indicators of anonymity 
and transiency are lower such as locations with relatively low popula- 
tion density ( Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006; Brueckner and Largey, 2008 ). 
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Additionally, we ﬁnd that while housing prices respond to the move- 
in of a sex oﬀender, as in the previous literature, rents of nearby homes 
do not respond to the move-in. We assume that this heterogeneity can 
be explained by the diﬀerences between homeowners and renters in 
their pattern of information acquisition and evaluation. Presumably, po- 
tential or current homeowners have a higher probability of acquiring 
information on the oﬀender’s move-in than renters because they have 
an incentive to search for information on neighborhood (dis)amenities 
more intensely, and they are more likely to be engaged in social inter- 
actions than renters ( Glaeser et al., 2002 ). As homeowners invest a lot 
more in housing than renters, and their investment risk associated with 
neighborhood disamenity is higher than that of renters ( Hilber, 2005 ), 
potential or current homeowners are likely to evaluate the presence of 
a sex oﬀender more sensitively. 
We interpret our results as suggestive evidence that social capi- 
tal and social networks are important sources of information on local 
(dis)amenities. The previous urban economics literature on social net- 
works has oﬀered evidence that spatial contexts of residence, such as 
population density and own housing tenure, are closely related with the 
level of social connectedness ( Glaeser et al., 2002; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 
2006; Brueckner and Largey, 2008 ). Our study adds insights on how 
such social connectedness can potentially inﬂuence the acquisition and 
evaluation of information on local (dis)amenities, which, in turn, can af- 
fect housing market outcomes. Two underlying mechanisms can explain 
our ﬁndings on heterogeneous price eﬀects by population density and 
by housing tenure, although our empirical design does not aim to diﬀer- 
entiate between the mechanisms. Households in low-density and, thus, 
highly-connected neighborhoods are more likely to acquire information 
on local (dis)amenities. Additionally, homeowners in less-anonymous 
and less-transient places may be more likely to react strongly. 
Background 
The impact of non-market amenities on nearby property values has 
long been a subject of study in urban economics. For example, studies 
have investigated the following: (1) the impact of a public release of 
the quality of public schools on nearby property values ( Figlio and Lu- 
cas, 2004; Bayer et al., 2007; Fiva and Kirkebøen, 2011; Kuminoﬀ and 
Pope, 2014; Imberman and Lovenheim, 2015 ); (2) the capitalization of 
environmental (dis)amenities in housing markets ( Bui and Mayer, 2003; 
Chay and Greenstone, 2005; Kuminoﬀ et al., 2010 ); and (3) an asso- 
ciation between known crime rates and housing prices (e.g., Thaler, 
1978; Schwartz et al., 2003; Ihlanfeldt and Mayock, 2010; Bishop and 
Murphy, 2011; Buonanno et al., 2013; Congdon-Hohman, 2013 ). Most 
closely related to our work, it has been found that the move-in of sex 
oﬀenders, a particular disamenity, negatively aﬀects nearby housing 
prices. Most empirical research took advantage of the public disclosure 
of sex oﬀenders’ location in the context of Megan’s Law in the U.S. Us- 
ing data from Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, Linden and Rock- 
oﬀ (2008) demonstrated that the move-in of a sex oﬀender within 0.1 
miles (169 m) reduced house prices by 4%. In Hillsborough County, 
Florida, Pope (2008) found a similar but smaller reduction in house 
prices within 0.1 miles of a sex oﬀender. Recently, two studies attempted 
to make a methodological improvement by adding spatial elements 
( Caudill et al., 2015 ) and by accounting for selection and simultaneity 
bias ( Wentland et al., 2014 ). 
Although these previous studies have provided useful insights into 
the average eﬀect of speciﬁc (dis)amenities transmitted in housing mar- 
kets, most have not addressed the potential heterogeneity in this ef- 
fect. One critical question for investigating such heterogeneity is how 
potential buyers and sellers acquire the information on (dis)amenities. 
The literature on social networks suggests the importance of learning 
and acquiring information via social interactions, especially through 
word-of-mouth communication. Empirical evidence has demonstrated 
that information sharing through social interactions plays an important 
role in investment decisions ( Guiso et al., 2004; Hong et al., 2004 ). 
Other researchers have focused on the spatial characteristics of resi- 
dential communities wherein social interactions occur. For example, 
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) and Brueckner and Largey (2008) sug- 
gested that population density has a negative impact on social inter- 
actions. Glaeser et al. (2002) demonstrated that the level of social in- 
teractions is higher among homeowners and those who are less mobile. 
Rohe et al. (2002) and Dietz and Haurin (2003) similarly reported a pos- 
itive relationship between homeownership rates and social interactions. 
Another critical question underlying the analyses of heterogeneity in 
housing market responses to local (dis)amenities is how individual par- 
ticipants in housing markets evaluate the information on (dis)amenities 
and make their own housing decisions based on this evaluation. Some 
scholars have begun to recognize the drawbacks of existing hedonic 
models with a strong assumption that the marginal willingness to pay 
for amenities or to avoid disamenities is homogeneous across all house- 
holds. For example, Bishop and Murphy (2011) suggested substantial 
heterogeneity in the household evaluation of crime by observed house- 
hold characteristics, such as income and race. 
In our setting, variation in both the acquisition and evaluation of in- 
formation can play an important role. First, current residents of neigh- 
borhoods wherein sex oﬀenders move-in can acquire the information on 
this move-in one of the following three ways: (1) an online search of the 
sex oﬀender registry; (2) mail notiﬁcation sent only once at the time 
the sex oﬀender moves-in to households with children under 18 years 
of age; and (3) information sharing with neighbors. The ﬁrst option is 
free, but the time cost may be large. To access sex oﬀender informa- 
tion on a personal computer, a person must install ﬁve separate security 
programs and then go through the identity veriﬁcation process. 2 While 
the second option does not involve any costs, it is provided only to res- 
idents with children under 18 years of age when the oﬀender moves-in. 
Therefore, similar to investment decisions, how information is shared 
among residents may play an important role in the decisions of those 
who do not receive the information directly from the government. On 
the other hand, an online search would be the main channel for po- 
tential in-migrants to collect oﬀender information. Unlike Megan’s Law 
in the U.S., which mandates real estate agents to disclose the presence 
of nearby sex oﬀenders to potential homebuyers ( Caudill et al., 2015 ), 
such information disclosure is not required in South Korea. Therefore, 
those willing to bear ﬁxed costs for the online search are more likely to 
learn about the presence of a sex oﬀender when compared to others. 
A further possible cause of heterogeneity in households’ response 
to acquired information on the presence of a sex oﬀender is variation 
in their evaluation of the information. Some households may evaluate 
this information more seriously if they are exposed to a higher ﬁnancial 
risk associated with the presence of a sex oﬀender. Some may perceive 
potential crime risks to be higher when compared to others due to their 
demographic characteristics or residential environments that are more 
vulnerable to such risks. 
Data and methods 
Data sources 
We use the nationwide data in South Korea that link the informa- 
tion from sex oﬀender registries with a transaction database of multi- 
family housing units. 3 According to the 2010 Census, multifamily hous- 
ing accounts for 71% of total housing in South Korea. Our data come 
from several sources. The ﬁrst is a dataset on all multifamily housing 
transactions, including both sales and rentals over the period January 
2 In addition, access is not fully supported on some web browsers such as 
Chrome or Opera. See the website ( http://sexoﬀender.go.kr ) for more details. 
3 Unfortunately, the South Korean government has not released transaction 
data for single-family housing units with individual addresses, and hence we 
cannot use them for our analyses. 
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2010–December 2014 in South Korea. 4 While our main sample pools 
all multifamily housing units, we consider heterogeneous attributes of 
apartments and other multiplexes by including the dummy variable of 
apartments (typically called “APT ” in South Korea) in our regression. 
The data, provided by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Trans- 
port, contain sales prices/rents, property characteristics, such as the 
ﬂoor area and story of the unit, and addresses. Since each multifamily 
housing complex is built on one parcel of land and only one address is 
assigned to a complex, we identify the centroid of this parcel to link spa- 
tially to the residential location of nearby sex oﬀenders. We describe the 
technical details later in this section. Using these addresses, we create 
neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects as well as neighborhood-speciﬁc quadratic 
time trends to control for housing market characteristics and temporal 
trends in our statistical analyses. 5 
The second dataset is the publicly available information on sex of- 
fenders. In January 2010, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 
(MGEF) launched a public website to provide personal information of 
sex oﬀenders and expanded the details of the oﬀender information in 
June 2013, such as the inclusion of the oﬀender’s photo. 6 , 7 When sex 
oﬀenders move to a new location, they are required to report a change in 
their residential location within 20 days. Their new address is updated 
on the public website, and the new oﬀender information is mailed to 
families with children who reside in the same neighborhood within one 
month of the report. The registry data contain a wide range of informa- 
tion on sex oﬀenders, such as current address, age, sex, portrait photo, a 
description of the sex crime they committed, sentence date, the duration 
of the sentence, and the age of the victim. We manually collected this 
information from the website run by the MGEF as of January 2014, and 
4 There are three forms of rental transactions in South Korea: (1) monthly 
rental (a typical rental contract type in the U.S. and other developed coun- 
tries), (2) jeonse , and (3) a mixture of these two. Jeonse is a unique real es- 
tate contract type in South Korea in which a renter makes a lump-sum de- 
posit on a rental space of anywhere from 50% to 80% of the market value 
of the unit in lieu of paying monthly rent (i.e., zero monthly rent). In ad- 
dition to our main analysis, which focuses on sales transactions, we exam- 
ine rental market responses to sex crime risk (see Table 5 ). To do so, we use 
the full sample of rental units in which the deposit is converted into monthly 
rents based on the oﬃcial conversion rate provided by the Korea Appraisal 
Board. Further details on jeonse can be found at http://english.seoul.go.kr/life- 
information/residence/housing/1-wolse-jeonse/ . 
5 Neighborhood units in South Korea are called Dong in urban areas and Eup 
or Myun in rural areas. These are the smallest geographic levels deﬁned admin- 
istratively in South Korea, and their median population size is approximately 
5,000, similar to that of census tracts in the U.S. In this study, we deﬁne Dong, 
Eup , and Myun as neighborhoods and use the neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects for all 
analyses. Larger geographic areas than these neighborhoods are referred to as 
Gu in big cities, S hi in small cities, and Goon in rural areas. In this study, we refer 
to these as districts and collect some key explanatory variables introduced later, 
such as population density and migration rates, at the district level. As neigh- 
borhood boundaries do not overlap district boundaries and each neighborhood 
is only in one district, our neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects soak up baseline variation 
in district variables. 
6 The website and details on the registration and notiﬁcation policy can be 
found at http://www.sexoﬀender.go.kr . The categories of sex crimes punished 
by criminal law in South Korea include various types of sexual assaults and 
abuse, such as rape, groping, harassment, consensual relationships with a minor 
aged under 13 years, and attempted rape. By court ruling, the personal infor- 
mation of any oﬀender who commits any of these crimes is subject to public 
disclosure. In most states in the U.S., including North Carolina, such oﬀenses as 
rape, sexual acts, other than rape in which force or violence is involved, child 
molestation, and attempted sex oﬀense or rape are subject to public disclosure 
(the federal Sex Oﬀender Registration and Notiﬁcation Act), and the listed of- 
fenses in the U.S. are very similar to those in South Korea. 
7 Our sample shows that most sex oﬀenders committed violent crimes: 33.25% 
committed rape, and 56.35% used forced physical touch (groping). 
this dataset was used for the main analyses in our study. 8 There were 
3,963 sex oﬀenders, and our ﬁnal sample consisted of 3,852 oﬀend- 
ers after dropping individuals with missing geographic information. As 
shown in Panel A of Fig. 1 , sex oﬀenders are distributed quite evenly 
across the country with somewhat higher concentrations in large cities, 
such as Seoul (shown in Panel B), which also have a larger number of 
housing units. 
Although our sex oﬀender data are cross-sectional data of the reg- 
istry record at a speciﬁc time (January 2014), we were able to construct 
retrospective panel data using the time and location variation in the 
dataset. We calculated the sex oﬀender’s date of release from prison, 
based on the duration of sentence for each sex oﬀender, and used this 
date as the proximate move-in date to the location in our data. For those 
who were convicted, but whose jail time was suspended, we assume that 
the oﬀender moved into the neighborhood of their residence immedi- 
ately. 9 
We acknowledge that there are potential measurement error issues in 
our oﬀender registry data, which could lead to treating a certain area as 
having a sex oﬀender when it does not have any oﬀender or vice versa. 
We omit some sex oﬀenders entirely if they were dropped from the of- 
ﬁcial registry before our data collection point 10 or if they were released 
and moved-in to the new location after our data collection point. 11 We 
also have some sex oﬀenders that appear in the sample but with incor- 
rect move-in dates, if they have moved to the location observed in our 
data after their release date or to a new location after our data collection 
point. 12 As both these issues are about the incorrect measurement of the 
move-in treatment, they will bias the impact of a sex oﬀender’s move-in 
on housing prices toward zero, and our estimate can be interpreted as a 
lower bound of the true negative impact in terms of the magnitude. 
Finally, we collect a wide range of information on surrounding areas, 
deﬁned as a 100-meter radius from the center of a complex. The geo- 
graphic information system (GIS) database, generated based on the pub- 
licly available cadastral map, provides useful data, including the num- 
ber of passengers at subway station(s); number of bus routes; number 
of convenience stores; number of kindergartens; share of built-up areas; 
share of undeveloped land; and number of students enrolled in elemen- 
8 As we were unable to retrieve archived data, our analyses focus on move-in 
eﬀects rather than move-out eﬀects. 
9 The oﬀender would have resided in this location at the time of the court sen- 
tence following which the information on this location would have been publicly 
released. 
10 The information on sex oﬀenders is publicly disclosed for a maximum of 10 
years and the most frequent disclosure period is 4 or 5 years in our data. As 
the public disclosure of information on sex oﬀenders began in January 2010, 
oﬀenders who were released before this date were not subject to the disclosure. 
Hence, only a small number of oﬀenders released in 2010 or 2011 with the 
required disclosure period of less than 3 or 4 years would have been dropped 
from the data before we collected the data on January 1, 2014. 
11 Since oﬀenders are in general included in the registry data soon after they 
are sentenced, we would miss only a few observations. These might include 
oﬀenders who were sentenced after January 1, 2014 and released before De- 
cember 31, 2014 with a jail term of less than 1 year; however, the average jail 
term in our data is approximately 2.5 years. 
12 Seventy percent of all oﬀenders were released within 2 years from our data 
collection point. Additionally, the extent of residential mobility of sex oﬀenders 
is not high, in our sample. We traced the registry data for 5 months until May 
2014 and found that 77 oﬀenders (less than 2% of the sample) were dropped 
from the sample and approximately 270 oﬀenders (less than 7% of the sample) 
moved during these 5 months. Additionally, we collected the registry data for 
the city of Seoul in July 2015 and found that 300 out of 748 sex oﬀenders had 
lived in the exact same location since January 2014. After accounting for 333 
oﬀenders who were newly added after January 2014, we found that only 117 
oﬀenders (15.6% of all oﬀenders in Seoul) had moved within or to Seoul over 
the 19 months between January 2014 and July 2015. Among them, 84 oﬀenders 
moved within the city of Seoul and the rest moved-in from other cities. 
3 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of Sex Oﬀender’s Location (as of January 2014). Panel A. South Korea. Panel B. Seoul. 
tary, middle, and high schools. 13 As in previous literature, these ameni- 
ties and the level of urbanity and urbanization are important determi- 
nants of housing prices and rents. Since all these area characteristics 
are measured at a very ﬁne geographic level (100-meter radius), 14 we 
expect them to be good controls in our main regression analyses. Addi- 
tionally, from the Korean Statistical Information Service, we gather sev- 
eral district-level attributes, including population density and migration 
rates, as well as neighborhood-level demographic characteristics, such 
as population size, number of females, and population under 18 years 
old, for the analyses on spatial heterogeneity. 
We use a GIS tool to measure the proximity of each transacted hous- 
ing unit to sex oﬀenders. Based on the calculation of straight-line dis- 
tances between the centroid of multifamily housing complexes and res- 
idential location of sex oﬀenders, we generate two binary variables that 
capture the presence of sex oﬀenders and associated sex crime risk, in- 
cluding the following: (1) whether the nearest sex oﬀender is located 
within a 150-meter radius and (2) whether the nearest sex oﬀender is 
located within a radius of 150–300 m. Our distance criteria are deter- 
mined following the previous research: the 0.1-mile and 1/3-mile radii 
used by Linden and Rockoﬀ (2008) and 0.1-mile and 0.1–0.2-mile radii 
used by Pope (2008) . Panel A, Fig. 2 , presents the price gradient of dis- 
tance from the nearest oﬀender; this suggests that the move-in eﬀects 
are mainly concentrated on housing units within a 150-m radius of the 
13 In South Korea, most public schools serve students in their residential zones. 
The residential zone for elementary schools is smaller than residential zones for 
middle and high schools. 
14 Our area characteristics are measured at a very ﬁne geographic level (within 
a 100-m radius from each complex), while our ﬁxed eﬀects are at a larger ge- 
ographic scale, namely, a neighborhood Dong . Thus, these area characteristics 
might not be absorbed by the neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects. 
nearest oﬀender, and the price decline gradually disappears as the dis- 
tance approaches 300 m. 15 
Sample of sales transactions 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample of sales transac- 
tions of multifamily housing units in South Korea. This sample is created 
by dropping all housing units that had more than one oﬀender location 
within a 300-meter radius between 2010 and 2014. In other words, the 
sample is composed of multifamily homes that were never near a sex 
oﬀender’s location (control group, column 3) and those that were near 
only one oﬀender’s location (treatment group, column 1 and column 
2). Following Pope (2008) , this restriction aims to ensure that move- 
ins of multiple sex oﬀenders do not obscure the treatment eﬀect. The 
subsample of the treatment group I is composed of multifamily homes 
within a 150-meter radius of only one oﬀender location during 2010–
2014 (column 1), while the subsample of treatment group II includes 
homes within a 150- and 300-meter radius from one oﬀender’s loca- 
tion (column 2). There are approximately 150,000 and 330,000 units 
in treatment groups I and II, respectively, and our control sample con- 
tains approximately 2.46 million units. Table 1 shows that the treatment 
groups and control group diﬀer in terms of several observable character- 
istics, and hence it is likely that also they diﬀer in terms of unobservable 
characteristics. Therefore, we propose an empirical strategy that utilizes 
a time dimension to allow us to generate cleaner identiﬁcation than is 
possible to achieve using a cross-section. 
15 Price gradients are calculated using a locally weighted non-parametric re- 
gression method often called LOWESS (with the default bandwidth of 0.8). 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Subsample of transactions within 150 
m from oﬀender 
Subsample of transactions between 
150 and 300 m from oﬀender Control sample of sales transactions 
Number of observations 153,458 330,819 2,455,604 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Unit characteristics 
Real price (in 1,000 Korean won) 142,276 107,325 171,769 131,819 190,169 163,004 
Unit area (square meter) 62.70 23.74 67.38 26.60 73.07 28.07 
Age (years) 14.48 7.60 14.33 7.88 12.46 7.79 
Age squared 267.50 246.10 267.60 250.10 216.06 235.44 
Floor level 6.66 5.41 6.86 5.83 7.57 5.83 
Apartment (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.72 0.45 0.73 0.45 0.83 0.38 
Area (within 100 m radius) characteristics 
No of bus routes 3.08 9.31 2.56 7.71 2.34 7.81 
No of passengers at the subway station(s) 34.97 866.3 77.23 1394.0 53.71 1480.9 
No of students enrolled in elementary school 18.24 115.4 15.55 114.2 19.10 132.2 
No of students enrolled in middle school 3.86 55.3 12.38 107.3 7.19 80.7 
No of students enrolled in high school 3.88 61.9 4.87 75.4 5.22 78.1 
No of kindergartens 0.12 0.34 0.13 0.35 0.12 0.34 
Share of built-up area (percent) 72.97 36.0 74.54 36.4 61.80 41.0 
Share of bare ground (percent) 1.76 10.5 1.68 9.97 3.30 14.4 
No of convenience stores 0.26 0.56 0.29 0.57 0.21 0.49 
District characteristics 
Number of Population 335,078 138,032 347,280 136,994 334,211 140,935 
Population density (persons/km 2 ) 6,865 6,967 7,958 7,204 6,090 6,628 
Note 1: All monetary values are in CPI-adjusted real terms (August 2010). 
Note 2: KRW 1,180 = US$1 as of May 2016. 
Empirical methodology 
As indicated by previous researchers ( Linden and Rockoﬀ, 2008; 
Pope, 2008 ), it is possible that the presence of a nearby sex oﬀender 
is correlated with unobserved property and location characteristics and 
with a temporal market trend. Cross-sectional regressions cannot avoid 
being subject to the problem of unobserved spatial heterogeneity and 
omitted variable bias. For example, if unobserved negative attributes 
already exist at or near the location that a sex oﬀender chooses, those 
factors would reduce the prices of homes within a 150- or 300-meter 
radius from this location immediately before the sex oﬀender moves- 
in. In fact, Panel A of Fig. 2 suggests that the price gradients prior to 
the sex oﬀender’s move-in are upward sloping for areas between 0 and 
200 m from the oﬀender’s location, and sex oﬀenders tend to move into 
areas with lower house prices. As the main goal of our analysis is to esti- 
mate the isolated eﬀect of the move-in of a nearby sex oﬀender on house 
prices, we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DID) approach using variations 
in the distance from and the pre- and post-move-in date of the nearest 
sex oﬀender as our main empirical strategy. 16 We employ the DID model 
as follows: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 
(
𝑃 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
)
= 𝛽𝐷 150 
𝑖𝑗𝑡 
+ 𝛿𝐷 300 
𝑖𝑗𝑡 
+ 𝜃𝐷 150 
𝑖𝑗𝑡 
× 𝑃 𝑜𝑠 𝑡 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝐷 300 𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑃 𝑜𝑠 𝑡 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑋 
′
𝑖 
𝛾 + 𝜑 𝑡 
+ 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜌𝑗 𝑡 + 𝜏𝑗 𝑡 2 + 𝜀 𝑖𝑗𝑡 (1) 
where P ijt is the sales price of housing unit i in neighborhood j trans- 
acted in month t , 𝐷 150 
𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is a binary indicator of whether a sex oﬀender 
moved-in during the sample period within a 150-meter radius of hous- 
ing unit i , 𝐷 300 
𝑖𝑗𝑡 
is a binary indicator of whether a sex oﬀender moved-in 
during the sample period within a 150–300-meter radius of housing unit 
i , and Post it is a binary indicator that the sale of housing unit i in month 
t occurred after the move-in of the nearest sex oﬀender. 𝜃 and 𝜆 pick up 
the post-arrival impacts of a sex oﬀender’s move-in within a 150-meter 
radius and a 150–300-meter radius on sales prices, respectively. For the 
temporal variation of Post , we limit our analysis to transactions that oc- 
curred within 1 year before and after sex oﬀenders’ arrivals, and we try 
16 We also conduct cross-sectional regressions using our sample. The results 
are shown in Appendix 1 . 
diﬀerent time windows, such as one month, two months, three months, 
six months, and one year. By doing so, we attempt to estimate the short- 
and long-term eﬀects of the responsiveness to the sex oﬀender’s move- 
in. 17 X is a control vector of property- and area-speciﬁc characteristics. 
We include the year-month and neighborhood ﬁxed eﬀects as well as 
neighborhood-speciﬁc linear and quadratic time trends to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 18 ∈ ijt is an error term. To account for the po- 
tential serial correlation of residuals within a neighborhood, we cluster 
standard errors at neighborhood level j, following the recommendation 
of Bertrand et al. (2004) and Cameron and Miller (2015) . 19 
The underlying assumption imposed by our DID model is that the 
treatment and control areas have parallel price trends. To validate this 
assumption, Panel B of Fig. 2 presents the price gradients by the dis- 
tance from oﬀenders and by the time periods prior to and after the 
oﬀender’s arrival (i.e., + /- 6 months, + /- 3 months, and + /- 1 month). 
The result demonstrates that price gradients do not evolve much prior 
to the nearest oﬀender’s move-in. One month after the move-in, there 
is a sharp drop in prices only for the treatment areas, and, at this 
time, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant, negative treatment eﬀect in our empirical 
results. After this short-term treatment eﬀect, the prices in the treat- 
ment areas return to the initial level, and treatment and control areas 
continue to have parallel price trends. Hence, Fig. 2 shows that treat- 
17 Previous research reported only 1- or 2-year time windows and did not re- 
port the shorter-term eﬀect of the information on potential sex crime risk. The 
analysis of the short-term move-in eﬀect is feasible in our research as opposed 
to previous research because our sample size is 15 times larger than that of 
Linden and Rockoﬀ (2008) or Pope (2008) . 
18 Both Linden and Rockoﬀ (2008) and Pope (2008) use only the year-speciﬁc 
ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, their speciﬁcations raise a potential concern with regard to 
omitting the short-term changes in housing markets. 
19 Alternatively, standard errors can be clustered at the neighborhood-month 
level. However, this cannot account for serial correlation within the neighbor- 
hood, and thus potentially inﬂate the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient 
estimates. We do not report the results using the neighborhood- and month- 
speciﬁc clustered standard errors, but we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient estimates in- 
deed become more statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that our results are 
statistically more conservative. 
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Fig. 2. Price Gradient by the Distance from Oﬀenders and by the Time Periods. 
Panel A. 1 month before and after the nearest oﬀender’s move in. Panel B. 1–
6 months before and after the nearest oﬀender’s move in. Note: Results from 
locally weighted non-parametric estimation of transaction prices on the distance 
from oﬀenders. 
ment areas did not experience a higher price reduction or lower price 
increase before the move-in of a sex oﬀender when compared to con- 
trol areas, and suggests that DID is a valid empirical approach for our 
analysis. 
We estimate the DID model using our primary sample of sales trans- 
actions of multifamily homes in South Korea. Subsequently, we com- 
pare these results with those of the previous studies that use sam- 
ples of single-family homes in the U.S. counties with almost identi- 
cal speciﬁcations. To explore spatial heterogeneity in housing mar- 
ket responses, we add the interaction terms of the treatment eﬀect 
and spatial characteristics, such as population density and migration 
rates, in the districts wherein the housing units are located. Addition- 
ally, we estimate the same DID model for the sample of rental trans- 
actions for the same period of 2010–2014 in South Korea and com- 
pare these results with our main results using the sample of sales 
transactions. 
Results and discussion 
Average housing market responses to the sex oﬀender’s move- in South 
Korea 
Our main quasi-experimental treatment examines the move-in of a 
sex oﬀender within a 150-meter radius of multifamily homes. We esti- 
mate the treatment eﬀect on transacted sales prices of these homes after 
the oﬀender’s move-in. We compare the signiﬁcance and magnitude of 
this treatment eﬀect with another treatment eﬀect found in homes that 
are located within a 150–300-meter radius of a sex oﬀender’s location 
and transacted after the move-in of the oﬀender. 
Table 2 shows the estimation results of a series of DID speciﬁcations 
that use the primary sample of sales transaction data. The results in 
column 1 demonstrate that the move-in of a sex oﬀender within a 150- 
meter radius causes a signiﬁcant reduction in sales prices. Prior to the 
oﬀender’s move-in, these homes were sold for an approximately 2.5% 
less price than homes with similar unit-speciﬁc characteristics that did 
not receive any oﬀenders and were sold in the same neighborhood and 
month. After the oﬀender’s move-in, however, homes located within 
a 150-meter radius of a sex oﬀender’s location sold for a price that 
was low by an additional 6.3%. For homes located within the 150–300- 
meter radius, the estimated price reduction after the oﬀender’s move-in 
was approximately 3.6%. As reported in columns 2 and 3, the mag- 
nitude of the reduction in prices after the move-in of a sex oﬀender 
within a 150-meter radius became slightly smaller when controlling for 
a neighborhood-speciﬁc quadratic time trend and characteristics of the 
surrounding area. 
The results presented in column 3 show that housing prices fall by 
5.5% for multifamily homes within a 150-meter radius of the nearest 
sex oﬀender 1 month after this oﬀender moves-in, when compared to 
the prices of similar homes in this area before the move-in. 20 This ad- 
ditional 5.5% reduction in sales price is statistically signiﬁcant at the 
6.9% level. A back-of-the-envelope calculation based on this result sug- 
gests that multifamily homes within a 150-meter radius of an oﬀender’s 
location sold for approximately KRW7.8 million less (US $6,632) after 
the oﬀender’s move-in when compared to the average transaction price 
of homes of KRW142 million (US $120,800) prior to the move-in. For 
homes located within the 150–300-meter radius of an oﬀender’s loca- 
tion, the estimated price reduction after the oﬀender’s move-in was 3% 
when compared to before the move-in. This 3% additional reduction is 
smaller than the 5.5% further reduction for homes within a 150-meter 
radius. Hence, the treatment eﬀect of the move-in of a sex oﬀender ap- 
pears to be strongest for homes that are very close to the location of a sex 
oﬀender and dissipates gradually according to distance to the oﬀender’s 
location. 
Columns 3–7 in Table 2 show the regression results using diﬀerent 
time windows, such as 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 6 months, and 1 
year. We see that the eﬀect of sex crime risk rapidly disappears 1 month 
after the oﬀender’s move-in. In other words, the sex oﬀender’s move- in 
South Korea appears to have only a short-term eﬀect on housing markets 
rather than an enduring eﬀect over longer time horizons. 
There is a potential concern that observed treatment eﬀects may 
arise from price movements before the sex oﬀender moves-in, as the 
time horizons are restrictive in our main speciﬁcation. We conduct ro- 
bustness checks by specifying a series of interactions of 12 time dum- 
mies (i.e., − 6 to − 5 months, − 5 to − 4 months . . . + 4 to + 5 months, + 5 
to + 6 months) with 2 distance dummies (treatment areas). As reported 
in Appendix 2 , we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant price movement before the 
20 As mentioned in the Data and Methods section, our sample has a potential 
issue of incorrect measurement of the move-in treatment. To address this issue, 
when limiting our sample to housing units transacted before February 28, 2014, 
which is just two months after our data collection point, results consistently 
show a signiﬁcant and negative price eﬀect. Results are available upon request. 
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Table 2 
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Regression Results: Sex Oﬀender Move-in Eﬀects on Sales Prices by Diﬀerent Speciﬁcations and Time Windows. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 month 1 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
VARIABLES log (sales price) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender − 0.0245 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0269 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0251 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0252 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0255 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0262 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0276 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0073) (0.0076) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender & Sold during __ month(s) 
after oﬀender moved in 
− 0.0633 ∗ − 0.0521 ∗ − 0.0549 ∗ − 0.0336 − 0.0200 − 0.0058 0.0035 
(0.0335) (0.0299) (0.0302) (0.0273) (0.0232) (0.0147) (0.0098) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender − 0.0068 − 0.0085 ∗ − 0.0070 − 0.0070 − 0.0073 − 0.0076 − 0.0092 ∗ 
(0.0053) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0050) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender & Sold during 
__ month(s) after oﬀender moved in 
− 0.0360 ∗ ∗ − 0.0294 ∗ − 0.0302 ∗ − 0.0178 − 0.0083 − 0.0026 0.0065 
(0.0182) (0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0141) (0.0117) (0.0081) (0.0057) 
Observations 2,939,881 2,939,881 2,939,881 2,939,881 2,939,881 2,939,881 2,939,881 
R-squared 0.896 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909 
Area (within 100 m radius) characteristics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood-speciﬁc quadratic time trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note 1: Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level are reported in parentheses. 
Note 2: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
oﬀender moves-in, for the main treatment group within a 150-meter ra- 
dius of the sex oﬀender. Consistent with our empirical results, the price 
reduction is signiﬁcant only for 0 to + 1 months, and the eﬀect dissi- 
pates subsequently for both treatment groups. In addition, we perform 
a falsiﬁcation test using false arrival dates that are six months and one 
year before the oﬀenders’ actual arrival dates. As shown in Appendix 3 , 
the regression results reveal no evidence that house prices in treatment 
areas wherein oﬀenders move-in were experiencing a downward trend. 
In short, both appendices 2 and 3 support the validity of our results by 
showing no diﬀerence in price movements between the treatment and 
control areas before the treatment. 21 
Comparisons with U.S. results 
To answer our ﬁrst research question on the international translation 
of evidence regarding housing market responses to the sex oﬀender’s 
move-in, we attempt to compare our results with existing evidence in 
the context of Megan’s Law. When we replicate the empirical strategy 
used for the U.S.-based studies conducted earlier, Table 2 demonstrates 
a signiﬁcant reduction in sales prices of nearby homes after the move-in 
of a sex oﬀender, and the magnitude of a 5.5% reduction is compara- 
ble to a 4% impact 22 found in Linden and Rockoﬀ (2008) . Given this 
signiﬁcant price eﬀect, potential sex crime risk appears to be consid- 
ered as a neighborhood disamenity in South Korea. Additionally, the 
results from our main DID model suggest a dissipating treatment eﬀect 
according to the distance from the location of the nearest sex oﬀender, 
and this ﬁnding is consistent with the previous studies undertaken in 
the U.S. context ( Linden and Rockoﬀ, 2008; Pope, 2008 ). Therefore, we 
conﬁrm the external validity of the signiﬁcantly negative and localized 
eﬀect of the presence of sex oﬀenders on transaction prices of nearby 
homes. 
However, our result of the short-term price reduction contrasts with 
the U.S. evidence obtained earlier that the treatment eﬀect of the move- 
in of a sex oﬀender lasts for 1 year ( Pope, 2008 ) or 2 years ( Linden and 
Rockoﬀ, 2008 ). Intuitively, if the new disamenity emerging from the 
presence of a sex oﬀender within a proximate location aﬀects the price 
reduction of nearby homes, then this eﬀect would persist during the 
21 While both appendices essentially perform the same test, Appendix 2 is 
slightly more ﬂexible. 
22 It is the average eﬀect over the period of 12 months. While Linden and 
Rockoﬀ (2008) did not explicitly report the post-1-month move-in eﬀect in their 
study, it is inferred to be approximately 10%, based on Figure 3 A (p. 1113). 
oﬀender’s presence. On the other hand, many previous studies on the 
price eﬀect of neighborhood (dis)amenities suggest the diminishing or 
temporary nature of this eﬀect ( Gamble and Downing, 1982; Kohlhase, 
1991; Figlio and Lucas, 2004; Fiva and Kirkebøen, 2011 ). One plausible 
reason for the rapid price rebound is the increasing cost of information 
acquisition over time. As mentioned in the Background section, in South 
Korea, the mail notiﬁcation sent directly to existing residents with chil- 
dren could be the main channel for acquiring information about a sex 
oﬀender at the time of the oﬀender’s move-in. Moreover, real estate 
agents are not required to disclose the presence of nearby sex oﬀenders 
to potential buyers in South Korea. Therefore, to acquire sex oﬀender 
information in the long-run, one would have to rely on an online search 
or acquire information from neighbors in South Korea. 
A further problem complicating comparisons of the United States 
with South Korea involves spatial contexts that aﬀect how informa- 
tion is acquired in the long-run and how the perception of potential 
crime risk is adjusted over time. Appendix 4 reports vast diﬀerences 
in spatial characteristics between our sample and those used for U.S.- 
based studies conducted earlier. For example, areas used for our sample 
(7,579 per square kilometer) in South Korea are almost 20 times denser 
than the two U.S. counties used in Linden and Rockoﬀ (2008) (510 
per square kilometer) and Pope (2008) (367 per square kilometer). Ad- 
ditionally, our sample areas in South Korea show higher in-migration 
rates than areas used for the U.S. samples. Fig. 3 illustrates the magni- 
tude of the diﬀerence in housing density. While there are approximately 
50 housing units within a 0.1-mile radius from the sex oﬀender’s lo- 
cation in the Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, there are approx- 
imately 580 housing units within a 150-meter radius in Seoul, South 
Korea. Based on this observation, we assume that such signiﬁcant dif- 
ferences in population density and population turnover might be poten- 
tially associated with their diﬀerences in the persistence of treatment 
eﬀects. We explore this assumption by addressing our second research 
question on the underlying mechanisms that drive the housing mar- 
ket responses by analyzing what factors drive heterogeneity in those 
responses. 
Heterogeneous housing market responses by spatial context 
Based on the urban economics literature, we propose two potential 
underlying mechanisms through which spatial contexts inﬂuence hous- 
ing market responses. First, if the level of social connectedness is higher 
in areas with lower density and lower population turnover ( Glaeser 
et al., 2002; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006; Brueckner and Largey, 2008 ), 
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Fig. 3. Comparison of Housing Density (Mecklenburg County, NC vs. Seoul, South Korea). Mecklenburg County, NC (Source: Linden and Rockoﬀ 2008 ). Seoul, South 
Korea. 
then there would be active and enduring information sharing regarding 
the presence of sex oﬀenders, which would lead to a more signiﬁcant, 
longer-term treatment eﬀect in these areas. For example, the level of 
information sharing among neighbors after the initial mail notiﬁcation 
may have been lower among multifamily homes located in denser and 
more mobile areas of South Korea when compared to that among single- 
family homes located in the U.S. counties sampled in the previous stud- 
ies ( Linden and Rockoﬀ, 2008; Pope, 2008 ). As previously mentioned, 
in South Korea, such information sharing is likely to be a particularly 
important channel for the long-run acquisition of sex oﬀender informa- 
tion because, unlike in the U.S., acquiring such information from real 
estate agents is not possible in South Korea. 
Additionally, since residents in large, high-density cities tend to be 
more transient and anonymous than those residing in smaller, low- 
density cities ( Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999 ), they could be more in- 
diﬀerent to their neighbors. Thus, the majority of existing residents or 
potential in-movers in areas with higher population density and higher 
population turnover may not perceive the arrival of a single sex oﬀender 
as a huge crime risk. This potential mechanism could help explain why 
no statistically signiﬁcant average price eﬀect is found past the ﬁrst 
month after the move-in of a sex oﬀender in our sample, which has 
much higher density and higher population turnover than the U.S. sam- 
ples in the existing studies. 
Both the density and transiency mechanisms may lead to spatial het- 
erogeneity in the housing market responses. We attempt to analyze this 
heterogeneity by using variation in the spatial characteristics among 
multifamily homes in our nationwide sample. Speciﬁcally, we use the 
interaction of treatment variables used in the main DID speciﬁcation in 
Table 2 with quartile measures of spatial attributes, such as population 
density and migration rates. 23 Table 3 presents heterogeneity in treat- 
ment eﬀects between the bottom 25% and top 25% in terms of these 
23 We try to address potential unobserved heterogeneity that may be associ- 
ated with both these spatial attributes and housing decisions. For example, if 
residents who are more sensitive to information of potential sex crime risk (e.g., 
females under 18 years of age) are concentrated more in areas with lower pop- 
ulation density than higher-density areas; these demographic diﬀerences might 
be another important source of spatial heterogeneity in housing market out- 
comes. Hence, we add the proportion of the female population under 18 years 
of age at the neighborhood level as well as the share of female population and 
the share of the population under 18 years of age in this regression. 
attributes. 24 First, the result suggests that depending on the time win- 
dow after a sex oﬀender moves-in the homes located in the districts 
in the bottom 25% of population density experience an approximately 
3–8% reduction in sales prices after the oﬀender’s move-in within a 150- 
meter boundary (columns 1–5). The size of the treatment eﬀect for these 
homes in the lower density quartile decreases over time but remains 
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for at least up to 9 months. Con- 
versely, homes in high-density districts experience no signiﬁcant price 
reduction after the oﬀender’s move-in (columns 1–5). 25 
Table 3 continues to report results of heterogeneity in housing mar- 
ket responses by quartiles of migration rates at the district level. The 
table shows that multifamily housing units located in the districts in 
the bottom 25% of migration rates experience a 4–9% further drop in 
sales prices after a sex oﬀender moves-in (columns 6–10). It is note- 
worthy that the move-in eﬀect for these units, which are located in 
areas wherein population turnover is low, remains statistically sig- 
niﬁcant at the 10% level over a period of at least 6 months. Con- 
versely, districts in the top 25% of migration rates do not experience 
any signiﬁcant price reduction after the oﬀender’s move-in and in- 
stead show insigniﬁcant positive coeﬃcients for most time windows 
(columns 6–10). 
To further investigate our ﬁnding that both population density and 
population turnover may inﬂuence heterogeneity in housing market re- 
sponses to the sex oﬀender’s move-in, we run a horse race between 
these spatial dimensions by including two interactions in one regres- 
sion. As shown in Table 3 (columns 11–15), we ﬁnd that population 
density plays a more dominant role in spatial heterogeneity in hous- 
24 Full results are shown in Appendix 5 . It suggests that results on price reduc- 
tion in low density/migration areas hold true only for sales that occur after the 
oﬀender’s move-in. 
25 Our DID approach focuses on a causal treatment eﬀect of the move-in of a 
single oﬀender. One may argue that the addition of one oﬀender nearby may 
mean diﬀerent absolute changes in the potential crime risk in densely populated 
areas than in sparsely populated areas. To further validate our results on spatial 
heterogeneity in the price eﬀect, we attempt to include all multifamily homes 
near multiple sex oﬀenders and use the number of oﬀenders per residence within 
300 meters, for each property and for each month. Results report that this con- 
tinuous oﬀender measure has a signiﬁcant negative correlation with the sales 
price. Additionally, such baseline outcome persists only in areas with a lower 
population density when we add interactions on oﬀenders per residence and 
population density. Results are not shown but are available upon request. 
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Table 3 
Heterogeneous Housing Market Responses by Spatial Context. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Population Density Net Migration Rate Both (population density and migration rate) 
1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
VARIABLES log (sales price) log (sales price) log (sales price) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender − 0.0215 ∗ ∗ − 0.0217 ∗ ∗ − 0.0224 ∗ ∗ − 0.0231 ∗ ∗ − 0.0235 ∗ ∗ − 0.0374 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0378 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0381 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0373 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0384 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0353 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0363 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0368 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0367 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0364 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0100) (0.00996) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0130) 
Within 150 m from 
oﬀender 
Sold during _____ after oﬀender moved in − 0.0104 0.000491 0.00676 0.00982 0.00950 − 0.0172 0.00198 0.00347 − 0.00360 0.00329 0.00269 0.0242 0.0237 0.0184 0.0159 
(0.0176) (0.0131) (0.00810) (0.00674) (0.00599) (0.0190) (0.0130) (0.00897) (0.0113) (0.00949) (0.0260) (0.0206) (0.0145) (0.0134) (0.0128) 
Sold during _____ after 
oﬀender moved in 
Bottom 25% of 
population density 
− 0.0817 ∗ ∗ − 0.0737 ∗ ∗ − 0.0491 ∗ − 0.0510 ∗ ∗ − 0.0267 − 0.0667 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0612 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0474 ∗ ∗ − 0.0500 ∗ ∗ − 0.0271 
(0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0266) (0.0233) (0.0223) (0.0258) (0.0237) (0.0208) (0.0214) (0.0203) 
Top 25% of 
population density 
− 0.0109 − 0.00705 − 0.00997 − 0.00798 − 0.00468 − 0.0216 − 0.0184 − 0.0215 − 0.0188 − 0.0129 
(0.0287) (0.0203) (0.0133) (0.0110) (0.00982) (0.0261) (0.0203) (0.0146) (0.0128) (0.0118) 
Bottom 25% of net 
migration rate 
− 0.0943 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0963 ∗ ∗ − 0.0725 ∗ − 0.0515 − 0.0388 − 0.0440 ∗ − 0.0679 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0533 ∗ ∗ − 0.0375 − 0.0291 
(0.0287) (0.0374) (0.0379) (0.0360) (0.0341) (0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0276) (0.0275) 
Top 25% of net 
migration rate 
0.00720 − 0.00643 0.00242 0.0190 0.0121 − 0.00122 − 0.0183 − 0.00605 0.00791 0.00662 
(0.0294) (0.0222) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0142) (0.0277) (0.0228) (0.0177) (0.0166) (0.0160) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender − 0.0149 ∗ ∗ − 0.0152 ∗ ∗ − 0.0154 ∗ ∗ − 0.0158 ∗ ∗ − 0.0160 ∗ ∗ − 0.0154 ∗ ∗ − 0.0162 ∗ ∗ − 0.0167 ∗ ∗ − 0.0175 ∗ ∗ − 0.0185 ∗ ∗ − 0.0256 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0264 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0269 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0271 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0278 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.00659) (0.00663) (0.00666) (0.00677) (0.00680) (0.00755) (0.00746) (0.00744) (0.00748) (0.00749) (0.00877) (0.00883) (0.00879) (0.00893) (0.00897) 
Between 150 and 300 
m from oﬀender 
Sold during _____ after oﬀender moved in − 0.00371 0.00368 0.00441 0.00564 0.00544 0.00316 0.0166 0.0125 0.0141 ∗ 0.0158 ∗ ∗ 0.0104 0.0220 ∗ 0.0197 ∗ 0.0169 ∗ 0.0185 ∗ 
(0.0115) (0.00756) (0.00531) (0.00476) (0.00454) (0.0149) (0.0105) (0.00779) (0.00724) (0.00689) (0.0191) (0.0120) (0.0105) (0.00990) (0.0102) 
Sold during _____ after 
oﬀender moved in 
Bottom 25% of 
population density 
− 0.0620 ∗ ∗ − 0.0287 − 0.0402 − 0.0249 − 0.0233 − 0.0553 ∗ − 0.0280 − 0.0472 ∗ − 0.0318 − 0.0305 
(0.0268) (0.0255) (0.0265) (0.0233) (0.0257) (0.0282) (0.0241) (0.0278) (0.0242) (0.0274) 
Top 25% of 
population density 
0.0383 ∗ ∗ 0.0139 0.0117 0.0126 ∗ ∗ 0.0122 ∗ ∗ 0.0252 0.00779 0.0167 0.0170 ∗ 0.0160 ∗ 
(0.0150) (0.0103) (0.00735) (0.00642) (0.00624) (0.0166) (0.0126) (0.0105) (0.00880) (0.00900) 
Bottom 25% of net 
migration rate 
− 0.0795 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0565 ∗ ∗ − 0.0330 − 0.0247 − 0.0260 − 0.0478 ∗ − 0.0424 ∗ − 0.0176 − 0.0126 − 0.0163 
(0.0238) (0.0235) (0.0242) (0.0236) (0.0233) (0.0255) (0.0222) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0215) 
Top 25% of net 
migration rate 
0.0208 − 0.0115 − 0.0238 − 0.0181 − 0.0206 0.00170 − 0.0208 − 0.0379 ∗ − 0.0288 ∗ − 0.0307 ∗ 
(0.0181) (0.0144) (0.0175) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0175) (0.0148) (0.0206) (0.0155) (0.0182) 
Observations 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 
R-squared 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area (within 100 m 
radius) characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District-level 
characteristics (e.g. 
%females under 18) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood-speciﬁc 
quadratic time trend 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note 1: Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level are reported in parentheses. 
Note 2: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1 
Note 3: Some variables such as district-level net migration rates and neighborhood-level % females under 18 are not available for all transactions in our sample. We exclude such transactions for this regression analysis 
to measure the treatment eﬀects based on the consistent sample. 
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Fig. 4. Distribution of Sales vs. Rental Transactions in 2014. Panel A. Transactions in South Korea. Panel B. Transactions in Seoul. 
ing market responses. This is because signiﬁcant and longer-term treat- 
ment eﬀects persist in lower density areas, while the magnitude and 
statistical signiﬁcance of treatment eﬀects become smaller in the areas 
with lower migration rates. Combined with the baseline eﬀect of the 
move-in of a sex oﬀender, a reduction in the housing price is approx- 
imately 2.4–6.4% and remains statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level 
for the ﬁrst 9 months in the areas within a 150-meter boundary and 
in the bottom 25% of population density. 26 This suggests that popu- 
26 We performed the F-test on the sum of the coeﬃcient of the post-move- 
in baseline eﬀect and the coeﬃcient of the interaction with the bottom 25% 
density, for each column. The p-values remain below 0.05 until 9 months and 
become slightly higher than 0.1 in the case of the 12-month-eﬀect. Hence, the 
lation density is a stronger driver of spatial heterogeneity in the price 
eﬀect. 
Our assessment of factors underlying spatial heterogeneity support 
our previous assumption that the enormous diﬀerence in population 
density between our sample and the U.S. samples in previous studies 
is related to the signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the persistence of the aver- 
age price eﬀect. It is noteworthy that the magnitude of the long-run 
price reduction for housing units located in districts in the bottom 25% 
of population density is comparable to the 2% from Pope (2008) and 
negative price eﬀect in areas in the bottom 25% of population density appears 
to be signiﬁcant during the ﬁrst 9 months, but it slowly fades out after 9 months. 
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Table 4 
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Regression Results: Sex Oﬀender Move-in Eﬀects on Rents by Time Windows. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1 month 2 months 3 months 6 months 12 months 
VARIABLES log (monthly rent) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender − 0.0152 ∗ ∗ − 0.0154 ∗ ∗ − 0.0153 ∗ ∗ − 0.0147 ∗ ∗ − 0.0145 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender & Rented during __ month(s) 
after oﬀender moved in 
0.0078 0.0066 0.0038 − 0.0033 − 0.0026 
(0.0066) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0045) (0.0033) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender − 0.0012 − 0.0014 − 0.0014 − 0.0014 − 0.0015 
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0049) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender & Rented during __ 
month(s) after oﬀender moved in 
0.0000 0.0038 0.0035 0.0016 0.0011 
(0.0043) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0023) 
Observations 2,114,084 2,114,084 2,114,084 2,114,084 2,114,084 
R-squared 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884 
Area (within 100 m radius) characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood-speciﬁc quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note 1: There are three forms of rental transactions in South Korea: (1) monthly rental (a typical rental contract type in the U.S. and other developed countries), 
(2) Jeonse, and (3) a mixture of these two. Jeonse is a unique real estate contract type in South Korea in which a renter makes a lump-sum deposit on a rental space 
at anywhere from 50% to 80% of the market value of the unit in lieu of paying monthly rent (i.e., zero monthly rent). In this regression using the full sample of 
rental transactions, we converted Jeonse deposit into monthly rents based on oﬃcial conversion rate provided by the Korea Appraisal Board. We have performed 
the same regression for the subsamples of monthly rental transactions and Jeonse transactions and results are consistent. 
Note 2: There are about 200,000 rental transactions from multifamily housing complexes that had no sales transactions over our sample period of 2010–2014. We 
exclude these transactions, which are less than 10% of total rental transactions, to address a potential diﬀerence in geographic distributions of sales and rental 
transactions and to assure that sales and rental transactions are not systematically diﬀerent. 
Note 3: Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level are reported in parentheses. 
Note 4: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
the 4% from Linden and Rockoﬀ (2008) . 27 As shown in Appendix 4 , 
the average population density of our subsample in the bottom quartile 
of Korean population density distribution is comparable to the average 
county population density of samples used in the two U.S. studies. Over- 
all, our results in this section suggest that housing market participants in 
lower density areas react to a change in local disamenities in a stronger 
and more persistent manner because they are more likely to collect the 
information on such disamenities and would be more sensitive to it. 
Heterogeneous housing market responses by housing tenure 
In the Background section, we hypothesize that housing tenure is an- 
other potential source of heterogeneity in housing market responses to 
the move-in of a sex oﬀender. We run the DID model using the sample 
of rental transactions for the same period of 2010–2014 in South Korea 
and compare these results with our main results for sales transactions. 28 
27 In terms of statistical signiﬁcance, our low-density areas show a slightly 
shorter-term price eﬀect for two potential reasons. First, our sample in low- 
density areas consists of all multifamily housing units, and hence their actual 
population density at the smaller geographic level should be higher when com- 
pared to that among single-family housing units. Second, as mentioned in the 
previous section, the institutional feature that does not require real estate agents 
to reveal information about the sex oﬀender may have led to a higher increase 
in the cost of information acquisition over time in South Korea (regardless of 
the spatial contexts) when compared to the U.S. 
28 One potential concern on this comparison is whether the spatial distribu- 
tion of rental units is comparable to that of owner-occupied units. As shown 
in Figure 4 , the locational distribution of housing units is not signiﬁcantly dif- 
ferent by the housing tenure status in South Korea. In fact, in Korean housing 
markets, the housing attributes (e.g., structure and size) are quite homogeneous 
across the housing tenure status, and the quality of rental units is not inferior 
to that of the owner-occupied units. To further address the potential diﬀerence 
in geographic distribution of sales and rental transactions as well as to ensure 
that these transactions are not systematically diﬀerent, we exclude rental trans- 
actions from multifamily housing complexes that had no sales transactions over 
The results shown in Table 4 demonstrates that the monthly rentals of 
homes within a 150-meter radius of the oﬀender’s location across dif- 
ferent time windows (columns 1–5) does not change as a result of an 
oﬀender’s move-in, and especially for the post-1-month-period (column 
1). These results are contrary to the signiﬁcant post-1-month move-in- 
eﬀect found for sales prices ( Table 2 , column 3). 29 
To explain such heterogeneous housing market responses by housing 
tenure, we propose potential underlying mechanisms based on the liter- 
ature reviewed in the Background section. First, renters are more likely 
to be young and single. Thus, they are less likely to be informed of the 
oﬀender move-in through mail notiﬁcation, which is sent only to house- 
holds with children under 18 years of age. Additionally, although a sex 
oﬀenders’ residential location is a publicly available information, it is 
time-consuming to access it online. Existing homeowners and potential 
homebuyers would be more willing to bear this cost and to search for in- 
formation on sex crime risk more intensively when compared to renters 
because such neighborhood disamenities aﬀect both future house price 
appreciation and their well-being for a longer time period. Furthermore, 
homeowners are more likely to acquire information on neighborhood 
disamenities through information sharing, as they are more likely to 
be engaged in social interactions than renters ( Glaeser et al., 2002 ). 
Both these presumptions suggest that potential or current homeowners 
our sample period of 2010–2014. These total to approximately 200,000 trans- 
actions and account for less than 10% of the total rental transactions. 
29 In addition to the DID regression of sales prices and rents, we run a linear 
probability model of sales and rental transaction volumes; this model uses a 
monthly panel of multifamily housing properties ( Appendix 6 ). Results suggest 
an increase in sales after the move-in of an oﬀender; in this case, the coeﬃ- 
cient estimate is statistically insigniﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with the DID 
results that current homeowners would acquire information on the oﬀender’s 
move-in and would subsequently want to move-out. On the other hand, the 
rental -transaction volumes go in the other direction; in this case, the coeﬃ- 
cient estimate is insigniﬁcant. 
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would have a higher probability of acquiring information on potential 
sex crime risk when compared to the renters. 
Additionally, potential or current homeowners would perceive and 
evaluate acquired information in a more serious manner when com- 
pared to renters because homeowners tend to be more sensitive to 
neighborhood disamenities, based on both user- and investment de- 
mand. Therefore, an increase in the neighborhood externality risk gen- 
erated by the move-in of a sex oﬀender may signiﬁcantly reduce the 
demand for owner-occupied units but not the demand for rental units 
in the treated areas closer to the oﬀender’s location. Our proposition 
is closely related to Hilber (2005) who argues that neighborhood ex- 
ternality risk is a major component of housing investment risk among 
homeowners. He demonstrates that an increase in a neighborhood’s 
externality risk, which is measured by residents’ perceptions of the 
presence of litter, junk, noise, and crime in the neighborhood, more 
severely impacts owner-occupied units than rental units. In our study, 
we speciﬁcally focus on potential sex crime risk as a measure of neigh- 
borhoods’ externality risk. Our empirical evidence on the diﬀerence 
in responses to this risk between owner-occupied and rental units is 
consistent with Hilber (2005) . In summary, we suggest that housing 
decisions of potential or current homeowners and renters based on 
their evaluation of potential sex crime risk are partially translated 
into the diﬀerence in responses between owner-occupied and rental 
units. 
Conclusion 
We analyze households’ reactions to a change in neighborhood en- 
vironments, with a focus on heterogeneity in these reactions according 
to spatial contexts and housing tenure. Sex oﬀender registry data that 
report the exact location of sex oﬀenders provide an excellent oppor- 
tunity to estimate such reactions. Using the nationwide administrative 
data in South Korea, we ﬁnd that house prices fell by 5.5% for mul- 
tifamily homes within a 150-meter radius of the nearest sex oﬀender 
in 1 month after this oﬀender moved-in. We also ﬁnd that this eﬀect 
decreases substantially with distance. Our results conﬁrm the external 
validity of a signiﬁcant localized price eﬀect associated with the move-in 
of a sex oﬀender beyond the U.S. context. 
However, we also ﬁnd that the price eﬀect rapidly disappears after 
1 month, and this ﬁnding is contrary to the previous U.S. evidence of 
persistent price reduction for 1 or 2 years. ( Linden and Rockoﬀ, 2008; 
Pope, 2008 ). This diﬀerence in the average price eﬀect is partially ex- 
plained by the institutional feature that oﬀender information disclosure 
by real estate agents is not required in Korea, in contrast to the U.S. Thus, 
the cost of information acquisition becomes higher over time in South 
Korea. Based on the analyses that account for spatial variation within 
our nationwide transaction sample, we demonstrate that the move-in 
of a sex oﬀender leads to signiﬁcantly heterogeneous housing market 
responses across diﬀerent spatial contexts. Homes located in areas in 
the bottom 25% of population density experience a greater, longer-term 
price reduction after an oﬀender’s move-in when compared to those in 
areas in the top quartile. Our proposed underlying mechanism is better 
acquisition of and higher sensitivity to sex oﬀender information among 
(potential) members in highly connected communities, such as places 
with relatively low population density. This mechanism also helps in 
explaining the diﬀerence in the persistence of the move-in eﬀect be- 
tween single-family homes in the U.S. and multifamily homes in much 
denser cities in South Korea. 
Finally, we ﬁnd that the responsiveness to the move-in of sex oﬀend- 
ers varies by tenure status of housing units. While the move-in of a sex 
oﬀender causes a reduction in sales prices, our results show no signiﬁ- 
cant change in the rents of nearby homes. Similar to our explanation of 
spatial heterogeneity, our proposed underlying mechanism that aims to 
explain this diﬀerence is related to the patterns of information search 
and evaluation. Due to higher investment and risks involved with home- 
ownership, potential or current homeowners are likely to be engaged in 
a more intensive search for information on neighborhood (dis)amenities 
when compared to the renters. For the same reason, homeowners are 
likely to evaluate potential sex crime risk in a more sensitive manner 
than renters, owing to housing investment risk associated with such 
neighborhood externality risk. 
Our ﬁndings suggest that understanding how information on local 
(dis)amenities is acquired, transmitted, and evaluated is important to 
the evaluation of the eﬀects of local (dis)amenities. In particular, such 
an understanding could be useful in explaining heterogeneities in hous- 
ing market reactions to local (dis)amenities. Our ﬁndings also suggest 
that social capital and social networks may play an important role in 
how information on local (dis)amenities is transmitted. Future research 
will be able to expand the analyses to other types of information when 
compared to neighborhood (dis)amenities. 
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Appendix 1 
Cross-Sectional Regression Results: Correlations with the Distance from Sex Oﬀender. 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES log (sales price) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender − 0.0265 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0285 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0268 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0074) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender − 0.0079 − 0.0094 ∗ − 0.0079 
(0.0055) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
Observations 2,939,881 2,939,881 2,939,881 
R-squared 0.896 0.909 0.909 
Area (within 100 m radius) characteristics No No Yes 
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood-speciﬁc quadratic time trend No Yes Yes 
Note 1: Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level are reported in parentheses. 
Note 2: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Appendix 2 
Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Model Results: Price Trends Over Time. 
VARIABLES log (sales price) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender − 0.0262 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.00743) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender Sold during __ month(s) before oﬀender moved in 
0 to 1 − 0.0131 
(0.0388) 
1 to 2 0.0157 
(0.00985) 
2 to 3 0.0125 
(0.0105) 
3 to 4 − 0.0183 
(0.0323) 
4 to 5 0.0126 
(0.0114) 
5 to 6 0.00960 
(0.00950) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender Sold during __ month(s) after oﬀender moved in 
0 to 1 − 0.0533 ∗ 
(0.0308) 
1 to 2 0.00132 
(0.0150) 
2 to 3 0.0176 ∗ ∗ 
(0.00883) 
3 to 4 0.00647 
(0.0114) 
4 to 5 0.0161 ∗ 
(0.00887) 
5 to 6 0.0131 ∗ 
(0.00748) 
Observations 2,939,881 
R-squared 0.909 
Area (within 100 m radius) characteristics Yes 
Unit characteristics Yes 
Year-Month FE Yes 
Neighborhood FE Yes 
Neighborhood-speciﬁc quadratic time trend Yes 
Note 1: Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level are reported in parentheses. 
Note 2: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1 
Note 3: The regression model includes the variables between 150 and 300 m, but their results are omitted for 
better illustration. 
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Appendix 3 
Falsiﬁcation Test. 
(1) (2) 
6-months prior arrival dates 1-year prior arrival dates 
VARIABLES log (sales price) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender − 0.0287 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0269 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0075) (0.0075) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender & Sold 
during 1 month after oﬀender arrival 
0.0101 0.0086 
(0.0090) (0.0087) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender − 0.0093 ∗ − 0.0078 
(0.0051) (0.0051) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender & 
Sold during 1 month after oﬀender arrival 
− 0.0069 − 0.0046 
(0.0116) (0.0119) 
Observations 2,939,881 2,939,881 
R-squared 0.909 0.909 
Area (within 100 m radius) characteristics Yes Yes 
Housing characteristics Yes Yes 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes 
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes 
Neighborhood-speciﬁc quadratic time 
trend 
Yes Yes 
Note 1: Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level are reported in parentheses. 
Note 2: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Appendix 4 
Comparisons with Previous U.S. Results. 
Research (sample) DID design 
Magnitude and 
endurance of the 
treatment eﬀect on sales 
housing prices of nearby 
homes Sample 
Average Population 
density 3 
Average In-migration 
rate 4 
Out study (Multifamily 
housing, Nationwide, 
South Korea) 
150 m & 150–300 m 1, 2, 
3, 6, 12 months before & 
after 
5% decrease for 150 m & 
1 month No eﬀect 
afterwards 
The whole nation 1 7,579/km 2 15.16% 
The subsample in bottom 
25% 
444/km 2 12.22% 
The subsample in top 
25% 
18,881/km 2 18.41% 
Linden and 
Rockoﬀ, 2008 (Singles 
family housing, 
Mecklenburg County, 
NC) 
0.1 mile & 1/3 mile 2 
years before & after 
4% decrease for 0.1 mile 
(about 10% for post-1 
month, from the graph) 
The county 2 510/km 2 9.15% 
Pope, 2008 (Singles 
family housing, 
Hillsborough County, FL) 
0.1 mile & 0.1–0.2 mile 1 
year before & after 
2.3% decrease for 0.1 
mile 
The county 2 367/km 2 13.41% 
Source: U.S. data from U.S. Census Bureau and Korean data from Statistics Korea 
Note 1: As our data consist of sales transactions of multifamily homes in South Korea, some rural neighborhoods and districts that do not have sales transactions 
of multifamily homes are excluded. 
Note 2: If areas where single family homes are located have lower density, the actual population density may be lower in neighborhoods used for U.S. samples. 
Note 3: For the U.S. data, this is the population density per square kilometer of land area data based on the 2000 Census. For the Korean data, the data are based 
on the average of annual data of 2011–2013 from Cadastral Statistics and Population Statistics. 
Note 4: For the U.S. data, this is the share of population that lived in a diﬀerent city, town, or county (including abroad) 1 year ago based on 2011–2013 American 
Community Survey 3-Year Estimates. For the Korean data, it is the share of population that lived in a diﬀerent district or city 1 year ago based on the average of 
annual data of 2009–2014 from Internal Migration Statistics. As both of the data include all housing structures and mobility rates are usually higher for multifamily 
homes than single family homes, the actual migration rate for the neighborhoods/districts used is likely to be higher for the Korean sample and lower for the U.S. 
samples. 
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Appendix 5 
Full Results of Heterogeneous Housing Market Responses by Spatial Context. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Population Density Net Migration Rate Both (population density and migration rate) 
1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
VARIABLES log (sales price) log (sales price) log (sales price) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender − 0.0215 ∗ ∗ − 0.0217 ∗ ∗ − 0.0224 ∗ ∗ − 0.0231 ∗ ∗ − 0.0235 ∗ ∗ − 0.0374 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0378 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0381 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0373 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0384 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0353 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0363 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0368 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0367 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0364 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0100) (0.00996) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0130) 
Within 150 m 
from oﬀender 
Bottom 25% of population density − 0.0195 − 0.0192 − 0.0193 − 0.0173 − 0.0213 − 0.0212 − 0.0198 − 0.0201 − 0.0184 − 0.0221 
(0.0228) (0.0231) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0236) (0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0230) (0.0232) 
Top 25% of population density 0.00637 0.00659 0.00722 0.00742 0.00716 0.0168 0.0173 0.0181 0.0185 0.0178 
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0153) (0.0154) 
Bottom 25% of net migration rate 0.0407 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0424 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0421 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0415 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0402 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0447 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0465 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0466 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0457 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0440 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0151) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0165) 
Top 25% of net migration rate 0.0118 0.0122 0.0118 0.00950 0.00997 0.00225 0.00300 0.00240 0.000554 0.000129 
(0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0146) 
Within 150 m 
from oﬀender 
Sold during _____ after oﬀender moved 
in 
− 0.0104 0.000491 0.00676 0.00982 0.00950 − 0.0172 0.00198 0.00347 − 0.00360 0.00329 0.00269 0.0242 0.0237 0.0184 0.0159 
(0.0176) (0.0131) (0.00810) (0.00674) (0.00599) (0.0190) (0.0130) (0.00897) (0.0113) (0.00949) (0.0260) (0.0206) (0.0145) (0.0134) (0.0128) 
Sold during _____ 
after oﬀender 
moved in 
Bottom 25% of 
population density 
− 0.0817 ∗ ∗ − 0.0737 ∗ ∗ − 0.0491 ∗ − 0.0510 ∗ ∗ − 0.0267 − 0.0667 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0612 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0474 ∗ ∗ − 0.0500 ∗ ∗ − 0.0271 
(0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0266) (0.0233) (0.0223) (0.0258) (0.0237) (0.0208) (0.0214) (0.0203) 
Top 25% of 
population density 
− 0.0109 − 0.00705 − 0.00997 − 0.00798 − 0.00468 − 0.0216 − 0.0184 − 0.0215 − 0.0188 − 0.0129 
(0.0287) (0.0203) (0.0133) (0.0110) (0.00982) (0.0261) (0.0203) (0.0146) (0.0128) (0.0118) 
Bottom 25% of net 
migration rate 
− 0.0943 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0963 ∗ ∗ − 0.0725 ∗ − 0.0515 − 0.0388 − 0.0440 ∗ − 0.0679 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0533 ∗ ∗ − 0.0375 − 0.0291 
(0.0287) (0.0374) (0.0379) (0.0360) (0.0341) (0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0276) (0.0275) 
Top 25% of net 
migration rate 
0.00720 − 0.00643 0.00242 0.0190 0.0121 − 0.00122 − 0.0183 − 0.00605 0.00791 0.00662 
(0.0294) (0.0222) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0142) (0.0277) (0.0228) (0.0177) (0.0166) (0.0160) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender − 0.0149 ∗ ∗ − 0.0152 ∗ ∗ − 0.0154 ∗ ∗ − 0.0158 ∗ ∗ − 0.0160 ∗ ∗ − 0.0154 ∗ ∗ − 0.0162 ∗ ∗ − 0.0167 ∗ ∗ − 0.0175 ∗ ∗ − 0.0185 ∗ ∗ − 0.0256 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0264 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0269 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0271 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0278 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.00659) (0.00663) (0.00666) (0.00677) (0.00680) (0.00755) (0.00746) (0.00744) (0.00748) (0.00749) (0.00877) (0.00883) (0.00879) (0.00893) (0.00897) 
Between 150 
and 300 m 
from oﬀender 
Bottom 25% of population density 0.0218 0.0210 0.0225 0.0213 0.0212 0.0212 0.0211 0.0232 0.0220 0.0222 
(0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0213) 
Top 25% of population density 0.00991 0.00978 0.00933 0.00875 0.00826 0.0160 0.0158 0.0144 0.0135 0.0127 
(0.00994) (0.00995) (0.01000) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0109) 
Bottom 25% of net migration rate 0.0283 ∗ ∗ 0.0292 ∗ ∗ 0.0278 ∗ 0.0273 ∗ 0.0279 ∗ 0.0310 ∗ ∗ 0.0319 ∗ ∗ 0.0303 ∗ ∗ 0.0295 ∗ ∗ 0.0297 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0151) 
Top 25% of net migration rate 0.00506 0.00590 0.00758 0.00795 0.00927 0.00608 0.00697 0.00951 0.00978 0.0113 
(0.00892) (0.00890) (0.00851) (0.00856) (0.00842) (0.00915) (0.00926) (0.00832) (0.00844) (0.00811) 
( continued on next page ) 
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Appendix 5 ( continued ) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Population Density Net Migration Rate Both (population density and migration rate) 
1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 1 month 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
VARIABLES log (sales price) log (sales price) log (sales price) 
Between 150 
and 300 m 
from oﬀender 
Sold during _____ after oﬀender moved 
in 
− 0.00371 0.00368 0.00441 0.00564 0.00544 0.00316 0.0166 0.0125 0.0141 ∗ 0.0158 ∗ ∗ 0.0104 0.0220 ∗ 0.0197 ∗ 0.0169 ∗ 0.0185 ∗ 
(0.0115) (0.00756) (0.00531) (0.00476) (0.00454) (0.0149) (0.0105) (0.00779) (0.00724) (0.00689) (0.0191) (0.0120) (0.0105) (0.00990) (0.0102) 
Sold during _____ 
after oﬀender 
moved in 
Bottom 25% of 
population density 
− 0.0620 ∗ ∗ − 0.0287 − 0.0402 − 0.0249 − 0.0233 − 0.0553 ∗ − 0.0280 − 0.0472 ∗ − 0.0318 − 0.0305 
(0.0268) (0.0255) (0.0265) (0.0233) (0.0257) (0.0282) (0.0241) (0.0278) (0.0242) (0.0274) 
Top 25% of 
population density 
0.0383 ∗ ∗ 0.0139 0.0117 0.0126 ∗ ∗ 0.0122 ∗ ∗ 0.0252 0.00779 0.0167 0.0170 ∗ 0.0160 ∗ 
(0.0150) (0.0103) (0.00735) (0.00642) (0.00624) (0.0166) (0.0126) (0.0105) (0.00880) (0.00900) 
Bottom 25% of net 
migration rate 
− 0.0795 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0565 ∗ ∗ − 0.0330 − 0.0247 − 0.0260 − 0.0478 ∗ − 0.0424 ∗ − 0.0176 − 0.0126 − 0.0163 
(0.0238) (0.0235) (0.0242) (0.0236) (0.0233) (0.0255) (0.0222) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0215) 
Top 25% of net 
migration rate 
0.0208 − 0.0115 − 0.0238 − 0.0181 − 0.0206 0.00170 − 0.0208 − 0.0379 ∗ − 0.0288 ∗ − 0.0307 ∗ 
(0.0181) (0.0144) (0.0175) (0.0131) (0.0145) (0.0175) (0.0148) (0.0206) (0.0155) (0.0182) 
Bottom 25% of population density − 2.306 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.307 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.307 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.308 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.309 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.316 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.317 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.318 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.319 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.319 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0462) (0.0463) (0.0461) (0.0461) (0.0460) (0.0464) (0.0466) (0.0464) (0.0464) (0.0463) 
Top 25% of population density − 0.0872 ∗ − 0.0881 ∗ − 0.0895 ∗ − 0.0913 ∗ ∗ − 0.0919 ∗ ∗ − 0.106 ∗ ∗ − 0.106 ∗ ∗ − 0.107 ∗ ∗ − 0.110 ∗ ∗ − 0.110 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0459) (0.0460) (0.0459) (0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0475) (0.0478) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0475) 
Bottom 25% of net migration rate − 0.00923 − 0.00932 − 0.00958 − 0.00978 − 0.00983 − 0.00958 − 0.00964 − 0.00988 − 0.0101 − 0.0102 
(0.00675) (0.00680) (0.00669) (0.00657) (0.00654) (0.00681) (0.00689) (0.00682) (0.00672) (0.00668) 
Top 25% of net migration rate 0.00589 ∗ 0.00589 ∗ 0.00589 ∗ 0.00582 ∗ 0.00583 ∗ 0.00638 ∗ 0.00641 ∗ 0.00645 ∗ 0.00646 ∗ 0.00651 ∗ ∗ 
(0.00329) (0.00329) (0.00329) (0.00329) (0.00330) (0.00330) (0.00330) (0.00330) (0.00330) (0.00331) 
Observations 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 2,209,508 
R-squared 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 
Unit characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area (within 
100 m radius) 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District-level characteristics (e.g. %females under 18) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood- 
speciﬁc 
quadratic time 
trend 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note 1: Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level are reported in parentheses. 
Note 2: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
Note 3: Some variables such as district-level net migration rates and neighborhood-level % females under 18 are not available for all transactions in our sample. We exclude such transactions for this regression analysis 
to measure the treatment eﬀects based on the consistent sample. 
Note 4: Variation in sales prices between areas with diﬀerent density quartiles mainly comes from the locational characteristics (rural vs urban). 
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Appendix 6 
Linear Probability Model Results: Sex Oﬀender Move-in Eﬀects on the Probability of Transactions. 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES Probability of sales transactions Probability of rental transactions 
Within 150 m from oﬀender − 0.0059 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0056 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0014) (0.0013) 
Within 150 m from oﬀender & Transacted during 1 
month after oﬀender moved in 
0.0026 − 0.0021 
(0.0021) (0.0024) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender − 0.0044 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0042 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0011) (0.0010) 
Between 150 and 300 m from oﬀender & Transacted 
during 1 month after oﬀender moved in 
− 0.0005 0.0016 
(0.0014) (0.0017) 
Observations 12,039,054 12,039,054 
R-squared 0.243 0.187 
Area (within 100 m radius) characteristics Yes Yes 
Unit characteristics Yes Yes 
Year-Month FE Yes Yes 
Neighborhood FE Yes Yes 
Neighborhood-speciﬁc quadratic time trend Yes Yes 
Note 1: The unit of analysis for columns 1 and 2 is multifamily housing complex-month. For unit characteristics, the largest unit area and the highest ﬂoor level 
among transacted units are considered for each complex. 
Note 2: Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level are reported in parentheses. 
Note 3: ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. 
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